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Budget Resolutions: Effective Planning
Mechanisms or a Waste of Time?
As part of the overall budget process, the Ukrainian parliament currently uses
budget resolutions to inform the Cabinet of Ministers about its budget priorities.
However, such resolutions have proved to be neither substantive nor realistic,
and have had little impact on the final budget document, calling into question
the rationale of their continued use. Mr. Peter Ricoy, advisor on budget analysis
to the Fiscal Analysis Group at Barents Group, believes that if such documents
were initiated by the Cabinet of Ministers and agreed to by the Parliament at the
initial stage of budget formulation, budgets would correspond more to strategic
priorities and ministries would be more informed on the realistic constraints to
their work
Why are budget resolutions
necessary?
Not every country makes use of budget
resolutions, and those that do have different
concepts of how budget resolutions work. In
the United States, the budget resolution
essentially serves as a means for providing
an aggregate fiscal constraint, helping to
prioritise spending across broad functional
areas, and providing planning for future
years. It is not necessary for Ukraine to
follow the U.S. model of budget resolutions.
However, in considering its own use of
budget resolutions, the experience in the
United States provides a few principles that
may help to guide Ukraine on the formation
of its own use of budget resolutions. There
are two primary areas where the use of
budget resolutions may be helpful in
Ukraine:
· Budget resolutions can be an effective
device for considering and setting overall
levels of government spending, revenues,
and deficits, and thus for providing an
overall budgetary constraint. With no
overall constraints on spending in place,
policymakers are not forced or able to
rigorously consider the relative tradeoffs of
spending on different programs when
making decisions.
·  Budget resolutions can be an effective
mechanism for providing longer-range
budgetary planning. A short-term budget
focus that only considers the next fiscal year
may contribute to spending decisions that
do not adequately address needed longer-
term solutions.
A lesson of the budget resolutions used in
both the United States and New Zealand is
that they present the long-range implications
of the government’s overall fiscal policy and
deficits. In both resolutions, a multiple-year
forecast is provided for revenues,
expenditures, the deficit, and the debt. This
allows policymakers to better understand the
implications over the longer term of running
deficits. In other words, it establishes an
overall budgetary constraint early in the
budget process. This is important for two
reasons. First, it helps policymakers to
understand that they cannot simply fund
everything they would like without there
being long-run consequences. Furthermore, it
helps budget agencies to see more clearly the
medium-term outlook, and to understand the
importance of medium-term planning.
What would be the important
components of budget
resolutions in Ukraine?
Consistent with the ideas of budget
resolutions in other countries, there are
three important components that could be
included in budget resolutions in Ukraine:
1. Defining strategic objectives. The
approach of defining objectives has been
successfully employed by New Zealand. The
idea is to clearly separate the overall
strategic objectives that policymakers would
like to achieve from the particular inputs or
policies that they choose. The objective is to
generate a basic consensus on the major
goals of the budget policy.
2. Defining overall fiscal policy
indicators. The starting point of the process
is a "baseline" forecast, which shows
policymakers the forecasted level of these
overall fiscal policy indicators over a
multiple-year period, assuming that the
current policies in effect stay the same.
Thus, revenues are forecasted based on the
continuation of the current laws that
establish taxes. Expenditures are forecasted
slightly differently, depending if they are
"mandatory" (such as interest servicing of
debt, or pension payments) or
"discretionary" (such as wages for personnel
or expenditures on computers), but the idea
is the same: the forecast for expenditures
assumes that the current policies continue.
3. Defining broad budgetary principles and
priorities. In the United States, the overall
expenditure total is actually divided up
among very broad functional expenditure
categories, such as defense, health, and
education. In New Zealand, on the other
hand, such a breakdown does not occur in the
Budget Policy Statement. Rather, the Budget
Policy Statement expresses in words the areas
of priority, such as "extend economic and
social opportunities", and "improve the
quality of the regulatory environment".
What determines
the effectiveness
of budget resolutions?
In order to successfully implement the use
of budget resolutions in Ukraine, there are
two key concepts that help the budget
resolution work effectively in the United
States: access to a considerable amount of
budget information, and the ability to
enforce the mechanisms of the resolution.
· Construction of budget resolutions in the
United States requires clear and unbiased
information, including projections of the
macroeconomic context in which the country
is expected to operate, projections of the
future budgetary outcomes under current law
(baseline budgets), information from the
executive on their spending requests, and
information about how proposed changes in
policy would effect the baseline for spending
or revenues (budget estimates).
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· In the United States, the budget constraint
as set out by the budget resolution is
effective only to the extent that its
guidelines are followed and enforced by
the Congress. The example of the U.S. shows
that budget resolutions do not necessarily
have to have the force of law to be effective,
as long as the rules are enforced within the
legislative branch. This may be especially
important in Ukraine, where the actual
budgets passed in recent years have shown
little resemblance to the budget resolutions
passed. Such divergences between the
budget resolution and the actual budget
undermine the role of the resolution, and call
into question the value of the Radas time
spent in putting it together.
Should the resolutions be
produced by the legislative
or executive branch?
In the United States, the budget resolution is
prepared by the Congress, while in several
other countries, such as New Zealand, it is
prepared by the executive. Part of this
difference is explained by the nature of
different government systems: in the U.S.,
the Congress is an entirely separate branch of
government whose members are not part of
the executive, and which has the authority to
initiate its own legislation. In New Zealand,
the government is a Westminster-
Parliamentary system whose majority or
coalition Members of Parliament are also
members of the government and select the
Prime Minister. In this respect, Ukraine’s
government is closer to the U.S. system.
However, there are many peculiarities that
should be understood about the U.S. system,
and there are also reasons why the
application of the U.S. system of legislative
preparation of the budget resolution would
not be appropriate for Ukraine. First, in the
U.S., although the document is prepared by
the Congress, it does not place any
requirements on the budget that the
executive branch puts together. Furthermore,
Congress is able to put together the budget
resolution by itself because it has access to
the most important information and resources
needed to put together such a resolution.
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine does not have
access to the same support agencies as the
executive. It has no independent capability
to produce macroeconomic forecasts, create
budgetary baselines, or conduct cost and
revenue estimates. Without this critical
information and institutional support, it is
unrealistic to believe that the Ukrainian
parliament would be able to put together a
very substantive document.
On the other hand, the Cabinet of Ministers
not only has the necessary analytical and
institutional capability to put together such a
document, but would also benefit by getting
more involved in defining the strategic
principles of budget policy. These principles
could be sent directly from the Ministry of
Finance, for example, to the agencies as they
formulate their budgets. Furthermore, the
establishment of an aggregate, top-down
fiscal discipline early in the budget process in
other countries has been shown to produce
more favourable budgetary outcomes.
Under the proposed approach, the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine would put together the
document at an early stage, and submit the
results to the Verkhovna Rada. The
formulation of the Budget Resolution would
have to start much earlier, like in April. After
submitting the document to Parliament, any
debate between the Cabinet of Ministers
should be over broad budgetary principles or
overall budgetary aggregates. Parliament
should have the opportunity to vote on the
budget resolution and to send a message to
the Cabinet of Ministers about its overall
broad priorities. However, the result of the
Parliament’s vote should not be binding, but
rather should provide information to the
Cabinet of Ministers about what are the
preferences of the Parliament. The Cabinet of
Ministers should use this information to
understand the political climate and attempt
to strategically formulate the budget to
respond to the most important priorities.
A seminar on "The Role of Budget Resolutions"
was held as a part of the ICPSs Centre of Policy
Excellence (budget policy) project on July 31,
1999. The presentation was made by Peter
Ricoy, advisor on budget analysis to the Fiscal
Analysis Group at Barents Group
last Week
Latest Transformatsiia. A new issue of
the bimonthly bulletin Transformatsiia, a
Russian-language version of the World
Banks Transition newsletter about
reforming economies, was published last
week, containing the following topics:
· economic effects of the Kosovo crisis;
· economic education in Central and
Eastern Europe;
· trade and exchange rate policies in
Kazakhstan;
· Chines rural reform;
· EU accession process;
· analysis of economic crisis in Cuba;
· applying target inflation levels in
monetary policy;
· active labour market policy in transition
countries;
· new views on the causes of Russias
economic woes.
If you wish to receive the bimonthly bulletin
Transformatsiia regularly, please send your
information to the e-mail address:
marketing@icps.kiev.ua or contact
Oleksii Blinov, ICPS marketing office,
tel. (380-44) 463-6337
Background on use of budget resolutions in Ukraine and how
they can be affected by the Budget Code
According to the budget process in Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada is required to adopt budget
resolutions by  June 15th each year. The budget resolution is supposed to contain:
· guidelines of the Cabinet of Ministers for the formulation of budget policy;
· an outline of priorities of the budget policy;
· principles for the state regulation of Ukraines economic and social development;
· principles for interbudgetary relations.
The budget resolution was designed to provide information to the Cabinet of Ministers for
its formulation of the draft budget, which must be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada by
September 15.
Although the Cabinet of Ministers is supposed to take parliamentary resolutions into account,
they themselves do not have the force of law, and the Cabinet of Ministers is permitted to
deviate from the resolution, as long as it mentions and justifies all such deviations in the draft
law on the State Budget.
At the same time the Budget Code passed by the Verkhovna Rada on May 19 suggests that the
status of budget resolutions would be elevated from that of a resolution to a law. Article 89
states that "the budget resolution and budget proposals are mandatory for consideration".
Article 130 suggests that the Parliament can reject the draft budget on the basis of non-
compliance with the budget resolution.
As envisioned by the budget code, the budget resolution would still be a short-term document,
focusing only on the next budget period. The Verkhovna Rada would still continue to put
together the budget resolution.
